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The Meaning of Kinship in Sharecropping Contracts
Elisabeth Sadoulet, Seiich i Fukui, and Alain de Janvry
1. Introduction 
  Theoretical analyses of sharecropping have called upon several arguments tojustify that 
this contract could be no less efficient han direct cultivation or fixed rent contracts, despite 
the incentive bias given by the terms of the contract. These arguments range from assuming 
that the landlord can specify the level of resource use in the contract and enforce it with 
supervision, toconsidering the sharecropping contract as embedded in a long-term ulti-
purpose relationship with the landlord that serves as an enforcement mechanism, to invoking 
altruism or social norms rather than personal benefit as the determinants of individual 
behavior. Most empirical studies directed at testing this efficiency hypothesis have compared 
sharecroppers' levels of input use or yield with those of owner-operators  fixed rent enants. 
Their findings are mixed, with some studies howing no difference among contracts and 
others observing clear under-use of inputs and lower yields for sharecroppers. However, 
whatever conclusion they reach, inefficiency or not, none of these empirical studies has 
enlightened the theoretical debate on the potential reasons why sharecroppers would be 
efficient despite their presumed self-interest behavior. To respond to this question, the 
design of our analysis is to contrast sharecroppers among themselves a well as with non-
sharecroppers, and to identify essential characteristics that determine why some sharecroppers 
behave fficiently and others not. The survey that we conducted in three villages of the 
Philippines identifies family ties with the landlord as a key determinant of cooperative 
behavior by sharecroppers and thence of efficiency. 
 To elucidate the significance of family ties for efficiency, we first review the theories and 
empirical evidence on efficiency in sharecropping (section 2). Our survey, directed at 
revealing the perceptions that sharecroppers have of the benefits derived from family ties,
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shows that they expect kin landlords to provide insurance more often than other landlords 
despite being generally of lesser wealth (section 3). We establish the behavioral contrast 
between kin and other sharecropping contracts by showing that the terms of the contract 
affect negatively the input decisions of non-kin sharecroppers but not those of kin 
sharecroppers (sections 4 and 5).
2. Debate on Inefficiency of Sharecropping 
  The Marshallian argument for the inefficiency of sharecropping is usually analyzed as a 
typical agency problem between a principal (landlord) and an agent (the tenant). Inefficient 
allocation of resources to production occurs because there is a difference between the tenant's 
optimum behavior (conditioned by the fact that he only receives a fraction of the product of 
his effort) and the "social" optimum (which measures the total benefit). 
 The argument can be briefly summarized as follows (Otsuka and Hayami, 1988). Consider 
first the case where the contract can specify input levels, including the tenant's effort, and be 
enforced. The optimal contract chosen by the landlord stipulates a level of effort that equates 
its expected marginal product o the marginal rate of substitution between effort and expected 
income. The terms of the contract are then chosen to ensure optimal risk sharing between 
the two parties and a level of utility for the tenant at least equal to his reservation level. 
Under these conditions, the expected marginal productivity of labor is equal on the tenant's 
and the landlord's plots, which is the condition for socially efficient resource allocation. If 
the level of effort is not enforceable, its choice is left to the tenant. Since the tenant receives 
only a fraction of the product, his optimal choice is such that the expected marginal product 
of effort is higher than the marginal rate of substitution between effort and expected income. 
Furthermore, in the optimal contract offered by the landlord, the tenant bears more risk than 
the landlord. Hence, output and labor per unit of land are lower under share contract han the 
socially optimal level. Inefficiency of sharecropping thus includes two elements. The first 
element is the incentive effect of the contract terms, which says that, at given risk bearing 
level, sharecroppers apply less input than fixed-rent enants and owner-operators. The second 
element is the risk bearing effect, where, under non-enforceability, risk sharing in 
sharecropping is less than the socially optimal level, although it is higher than under fixed-
rent contract. 
  This issue of contract enforcement iscommon to all problems of cooperation. Sharetenancy 
has been treated as an agency problem by assuming that the landlord is able to appropriate 
all the surplus that the socially optimum solution would generate, and that he will not default 
on the contract erms himself. The first assumption, which is determinant for the definition
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of the contractual terms and the distribution of the rent, may be debated (Bell, 1989). However, 
even with different rules about he choice of the contract erms, as long as the tenant receives 
only a share of output, there will be a difference between the sharetenant's hort-term 
individual optimum (the non-cooperative solution) and the social optimum (the cooperative 
solution). Hence, although the cooperative solution will be best for both partners (at least if 
some of the benefits accrue to both), there is an incentive to cheat on the contract; this is the 
standard prisoner's dilemma. We can thus draw on the general theory of cooperation to 
establish the conditions under which landlord and tenant can be expected to behave 
cooperatively, which means for the tenant o choose the efficient level of labor use, and for 
the landlord to respect payment of whatever compensating settlement has been agreed upon. 
  Cooperative soluions are obtained under four types of conditions: 
  i) Individual non-cooperative behavior is identical to the cooperative choice. This may 
be due to pure technological constraints (Rao, 1971) or when the landlord controls plot size 
and the elasticity of substitution between land and labor is equal to one (Otsuka and Hayami, 
1988). It also occurs when partners are altruisic and have internalized the social optimum in 
their own objective (Arrow, 1968; Simon, 1991). When the tenant is highly risk averse, 
behaving according to the safety-first rather than the expected utility rule, individual choice 
corresponds to the efficient labor input (Sadoulet, Fukui, and de Janvry, 1993). The contract 
terms can also induce efficiency when the sharing rules on all inputs and output are identical 
(Bliss and Stern, 1982; Nabi, 1986). Critics contend that the cost of the tenant's effort 
cannot really be observed and shared, and that, even for purchased inputs like fertilizers, the 
possibility of resale cancels out the expected corrective effect of cost sharing (Bardhan, 
1984). Furthermore, as Braveman and Stiglitz (1986) have argued, the equal sharing rule is 
not optimum so long as the levels of use of some other inputs are not enforceable. 
  ii) The tenant's work effort can be costlessly enforced by landlords (Johnson, 1950; Cheung, 
1969). A requirement for enforcement isthat the effort be observable not only by the landlord 
himself but also by a third party so that the landlord cannot be accused of cheating on the 
contract, and that there exist sufficiently high penalties that can be imposed cheaply on the 
tenant. These requirements have been criticized as unrealistic, at least in one-time contracts, 
since when one assumes that the tenant remains at his reservation utility, even termination of 
the contract would do him no harm. 
  iii) Infinitely repeated contracts. In many cases, there is no obvious "punishment" that 
can be imposed on the tenant beyond loss of the cooperative benefit. Threat of eviction may 
act as an effective deterrent to cheating and cooperation becomes ustainable when the benefits 
are sufficient and appropriately shared. Standard cases are infinitely repeated contractts
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with sufficiently low discount rates, or finite contracts with uncertain termination date but 
sufficiently high probability of continuing. In those cases, the cumulative benefit of 
cooperation over an extended period of time is higher than the short erm gain from cheating 
(Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta, 1989). In a gift exchange model, the minimum level of benefit 
and the range of sharing that can sustain cooperation and hence efficiency can thus be 
established (Sadoulet, Fukui, and de Janvry, 1993). 
  iv) Interlinked contracts open anotherrange of enforcement mechanisms. Credit 
transactions, insurance, and sometimes marketing of the tenant's product by the landlord, 
are commonly observed complementary contracts between landlord and tenant (Otsuka, 
Chuma, and Hayami, 1992). In some situations, interlinkage changes the incentive structure 
for the tenant, for instance by reducing risk aversion (Subramamian, 1993). In other situations, 
interlinkage acts as a threat that induces cooperative behavior, for instance when the 
punishment for cheating on one contract cancels the possibility of other transactions. 
  The family and social networks incorporate several of these dimensions. Some elements 
of altruism among kinship reduce the conflict of interest between the two partners and create 
relations of trust and confidence in which cheating is less likely to occur. Families are by 
nature long-term relationships, and commonly sources of mutual assistance and insurance. 
In the particular context of the Philippines, where sharecropping is illegal, the risk of being 
denounced and thence of contract ermination is probably lower among kin than it is among 
non-related partners. 
  Empirical evidence on the efficiency of sharecropping ismostly based on the comparison 
of average output and inputs per unit of land between sharetenancy and direct cultivation or 
fixed-rent tenancy. Otsuka and Hayami (1988) record the results of 217 comparisons of 
output between sharetenants and owner-operators and 53 between sharetenants and fixed-
rent tenants, 12 and 18 comparisons of labor use, and 55 and 11 comparisons of fertilizer 
use, respectively. They conclude that, while there is some dispersion in the results, with 
some analyses exhibiting significant differences among tenancies, on average there is no 
systematic bias of lower yield or input use by sharecroppers. Their interpretation does not 
negate the Marshallian inefficiency, but it suggests that only landlords who do have access 
to a relatively efficient and cheap mechanism to monitor the tenant choose sharecropping. 
Hence, a natural selection of contracts with mostly leave the efficient sharecropping contracts 
to be observed (Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami, 1992). Considering the theories that we have 
reviewed above, the important question would be to sort out the mechanisms by which 
sharecropping efficiency is achieved, when it is observed, and to check that these mechanisms 
are indeed all missing when inefficient sharecropping is observed.
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 In the studies that support efficiency of sharecropping authors report hat contracts are 
made between family members (Cohen, 1983), in patron-client relationships (Hayami and 
Kikuchi, 1990; Bardhan and Rudra, 1980), or when tenants can be closely supervised (Nabi, 
1986, for Pakistan). In two studies from India that exhibit significant inefficiency ofconverted 
from share tenancy to fixed rent contracts, with retgulated levels of rent (Operation Leasehold). 
 The limit imposed on tenancy, and particularly the prohibition of sharetenancy, was bound 
to induce major adjustments in the incidence ofcontractual rrangements. These came under 
several forms, particularly: i) a number of mechanisms bywhich the landlords could evade 
the limits; ii) very unequal implementation f the land reform across regions, despite the 
official report; iii) maintenance of the less vulnerable form of sharetenancy with family 
members; and iv) resurgence of alternative contracts, particularly land pawning and katsupong 
(Hayami, Quisumbig, and Adriano, 1990). The last three clearly bear on the efficiency of 
land cultivation that remains under contractual rrangements. 
  We conducted a household survey in threevillages in July-August 1992. Village Tu is 
approximately 90 km to the East of Manila, in the state of Laguna, which is part of the 
lowland area of the island of Luzon commonly called "the rice bowl of the Philippines". 
This is a rich area, almost entirely irrigated, with high population density and well-developed 
infrastructure. Villages Du and Aq are in the State of Aklan in Panay island. This area 
always had mostly small scale farming and hence was not subject to extensive land transfers 
under the land reform. Village Du is 18 km West of the State capital and connected with 
good roads. Village Aq is the poorest, least irrigated, and most isolated of the three villages. 
Table I shows that, despite its illegally, sharecropping is still practiced, particularly in the 
villages of Panay island, with 22% of the plots in Tu, 27% in Du, and 50% in Aq. This 
confirms the general finding that implementation of the land reform has been very uneven, 
more strictly enforced in the areas closer to government control or where peasant movements 
had been stronger, and less respected in more isolated areas. Implementation has also been 
more vigorously fought for and is hence more complete in the richer areas of Central Luzon, 
where the benefits of the reform were larger for the former sharecroppers (Ostuka, 1991). 
For the new owners, large economic gains came with the Green Revolution as compensation 
for land transfers was based on pre-Green Revolution yields and profits. Benefits of switching 
from share tenancy to fixed rent tenancy came from rent regulation that set rent at a level 
roughly equal to 25% of pre-Green Revolution yield, rather than the 33 to 50% commonly 
found in sharecropping contracts. While the Green Revolution and rent regulations have 
tilted the balance in favor of fixed rent for the tenant, he standard benefits of sharecropping 
remain sufficient for sharecropping to prevail in 28% of the tenanted plots in Tu, 38% in Du,
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and 70% in Aq. 
  The othercontrast between villages is that sharecropping is exclusively practiced with kin 
landlords in Tu, while other sharecropping arrangements increase in importance as one moves 
further away from tight government control to Du and Aq. This is likely because given 
illegally of the contract, the risk of being denounced is less with tenants related by family 
ties. 
  The restriction on land transactions has also given way to the emergence or resurgence of 
alternative contracts. One of them, which is used by both tenants and owners in village Tu, 
is the gama contract in which the workers weed without receiving wages for a right to 
participate in harvesting and threshing the plot and to receive a share, usually one-sixth, of 
the harvest. Although the contract applies to a subset of the tasks, the incentive scheme is 
very similar to a sharetenancy contract. Some farmers from village Tu acknowledge that 
gama workers did not weed as well as daily wage or family workers. This contract seems to 
be disappearing in the region. We will take the presence of gams workers into account when 
analyzing the relative efficiency of different tenurial arrangements. 
  We attempted to elucidate the content of kinship relations through a survey of tenants' 
perceptions. The hypotheses to check were that kinship relations induce altruism and relations 
of trust, offer longer expected contractual relationships and greater security, and give access 
to insurance or other types of interlinked transactions. Getting tenants to reveal their true 
perception on some of these issues, altruism or trust for instance, turned out to be quite 
difficult, and no contrasts were uncovered by questions on the quality of the relationship 
with the landlord. Similarly, given illegality of sharecropping, we could not capture the 
perception of expected contract length or contract security, which we expected to be greater 
with family ties. 
  We found,however, some interesting results on the extent of insurance given by landlords 
and the nature of reciprocity in maintaining good relationships. These are summarized in 
Table II. Kin landlords help or are expected to help in case of emergency more often than 
other landlords. This difference is significant for sharecroppers, where 82.8% of the kin 
landlords provide help against 63.6% of the non-kin landlords. Sharecroppers also receive 
more frequently insurance from their landlords than do fixed-rent tenants. Tenants were 
asked under what forms they receive help, with a choice between decreased rent, gifts in 
grain or in cash, or credit, and the possibility of selecting several of these responses. The 
contrast between the two types of sharecroppers shows that kin landlords who help their 
tenants use more instruments than do other landlords, with an average of 1.4 instruments 
compared to 1 for the other landlords. Because of fungibility between rent and grain for the
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sharecroppers, and possibly between cash gift and credit for all, these categories cannot be 
contrasted too strictly. However, only kin landlords use rent reduction or gifts in grain in 
case of emergency. Non-kin landlords use exclusively cash transfers or credit. 
 All tenants answered that hey had good relationships with their landlords. However, 
when asked how they contribute to maintaining this relationship, tenants with family ties 
showed a more active participation than the other tenants, with 75.9% for the other 
sharecroppers. Gift giving from tenant o landlord is common for all sharecroppers, but hard 
work on the plots and reciprocal insurance is almost exclusively practiced by tenants with 
family ties with their landlords. The reciprocity of insurance between tenant and landlord is 
also observed with fixed rent tenants, but there are no significant differences between kin 
and other tenants. 
  Sharecroppers who take contracts with non-kin landlords rely more frequently on their 
landlord as their sole source of insurance, and take contracts more frequently with landlords 
which they perceive as rich. (The information on whether the landlord was rich, average, or 
poor, was asked to the tenant o capture his perception, which is what matters in this decision.) 
By contrast, this suggests that, when there is a family link, more frequent help and a wider 
range of coverage compensate for the eventual esser wealth of the landlords.
4. Test of Efficiency of Kinship Sharetenancy 
 The general tenancy contract isdefined by (r, R), where r (0<_ r<_ 1) is the landlord's share 
of output and R a fixed payment per unit of area. The fixed rent contract is obtained with r 
= 0, and sharecropping with r > 0. Assuming that plot size is exogenous to the input decision 
under consideration, the problems is written for a unit of area, with production q function of 
labor L, purchased inputs x, fixed factors z, and the realization of a random variable 0, 
distributed with mean 1 and variance 6Z. If 8q (x, L; z) is output at harvest ime, the tenant's 
income y is:
  where p, p,,, and w are prices of output, purchased inputs, and labor, and T is non-farm 
income. 
 We assume that the tenant chooses the levels of labor and inputs that maximize his expected 
utility.
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The first order condition for labor gives:
which indicates that resource allocation will be inefficient since the expected marginal 
productivity of labor (pq'L) will not be equal across holdings. This expression identifies 
two potential sources of inefficiency: the standard Marshallian incentive ffect of the contract 
term r, and variation of the risk factor (EU'/EU'O) when there is not a perfect insurance 
market. 
 Taking a first-order Taylor expansion of the utility function around 0 = 1, and denoting by 
p the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the optimal labor use by a non-cooperating 
sharecropper is given by the solution of the following equation:
(1)
 A cooperating sharecropper accepts to use the level of input which the landlord would 
want him to use. This level is hence the solution of the enforceable contract, where the 
landlord maximizes his expected utility with respect to L, x, r, and R:
  where Z is the landlord's other income, and W the tenant's reservation utility. 
this problem give the optimal labor use as the solution to:
Solution to
(2)
 Finally, a fixed-rent tenant or owner-operator chooses the optimal labor input as a non-
cooperating sharecropper with r = 0, which gives:
(3)
 Similar expressions can be derived for input use x. In equations (1) to (3), the left hand 
sides indicate the direct disincentive effect of the sharecropping contract for the non-
cooperative sharecropper. The negative term in the right hand side bracket accounts for the 
disincentive ffect due to risk. This effect is greater with greater isk aversion p, greater isk
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6, and greater share of the expected value of risky income in total income (1 - r)pq/y. 
 Two additional elements can be endogenized in this model: the contract terms and off-
farm income. Endogeneity of the contract terms is usually modeled as the choice of the 
optimum contract by the landlord in a principal-agent framework. Under enforceability, the 
optimal contract ensures perfect risk sharing between landlord and sharecropper, while, under 
non-enforceability, the tenant is left to bear higher risk (Singh, 1989). This would reinforce 
the difference in input use between the two types of sharecroppers. The comparison between 
non-cooperating sharecroppers and fixed-rent tenant or owner-operator is, however, 
ambiguous. Sharecroppers bear the negative incentive of contract terms, but enjoy more 
risk sharing than fixed-rent enant or owner-operators. Unfortunately, in the empirical analysis 
that follows, we do not have enough information on landlords to consider the endogeneization 
of the contract. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the tenant's decision 
making, at given contract erms. 
  The second element that can be endogenized is the income strategy of the tenant. The 
expressions above are derived from a simple tenant's optimization model, with endogenous 
choice of inputs in agricultural activity but exogenous off-farm income and plot size. In a 
broader context, the risk management or portfolio choice between agricultural activity and 
non-agricultural ctivity is obviously endogenous, and function of many aspects not considered 
here, such as availability of credit or insurance mechanisms. For the empirical analysis, we 
will thus consider the following system explaining both the share of expected risky income 
in total income s0, and the input choices in agriculture, L and x:
and for the non cooperating sharecroppers
for the other producers
with similar expressions for inputs x. 
 A log-linearization of the labor demand function that derives from these structural equations 
is written as:
where Snc is a dummy variable for the non-cooperating sharecroppers. 




where S, and Sf are dummy variables for the plots under sharecropping contract with a non-
kin landlord and a kin landlord, respectively. A test of the null hypothesis ofefficiency of 
sharecropping under kinship is thus done directly on the impact of the contract shares on 
factor use as opposed to the usual test on tenancy dummies. The test consists in the following 
propositions:
Kin sharecroppers are unaffected by the terms of the contract 
Non-kin sharecroppers respond to the terms of the contract 
Parameter constraint in equation (4)
Alternative specifications of labor input
  Sharecroppers as well as fixed-rent tenants and owner-operators, use both family labor 
and hired workers. As the payment schemes of these two categories of workers differ, their 
incentives to effort also differ. This can lead to various worked organizations with 
specialization of tasks (leaving those tasks which are easier to monitor to hired workers) 
and/or use of supervision. Depending upon whether family and hired labor are considered 
perfect or imperfect substitutes in production, the disaggregation of the labor input is 
conceptualized in two alternative ways: 
 i) Family labor F and hired labor H are assumed to be perfect substitutes. Production is 
function of total labor, L = F + H. If hired labor needs to be supervised, the opportunity cost 
of family labor is wF = (1 - (X)wH, where awH is the difference in effective cost between 
family and hired labor. In this case, what is the marginal cost w of an additional worker 
when there is hired labor? If family labor is limited in number and considered a fixed factor, 
the marginal cost of a worker is the cost of a hired worker, and w = wH. If the ratio f family 
labor to total labor, 5F, is exogenous due to supervision requirements, the marginal cost of 
labor is equal to the average wage:
The logarithm of this marginal cost can be approximated by:
 These two alternatives lead to the 
exogenous variables:




 ii) Family labor and hired workers are imperfect substitutes, and hence are considered as 
different factors of production. The maximization problem can be written:
 The choice of purchased inputs and hired la 
where F is treated as a pseudo-fixed factor.
bor are determined by the internal maximization 
This gives:
and
In the empirical analysis that follows, we estimate these two mod els.
[Model 2]
5. Data and Empirical Results 
  The farm householdsurvey contains information on the rice production activity by plot 
(technology, labor input, fertilizer use, and use of machinery or animal power), on the 
household's general economic conditions (family size, family labor force, education, land 
assets, ownership of machinery, off-farm income, and debt), and on wages and fertilizer 
prices. We also collected the average rice prices received for sales at the household level. 
However, since the National Food Authority intervenes in the rice market to support and 
stabilize prices to farmers, this realized price does not inform on the expected price anticipated 
when farming decisions are made. This can explain why the rice price was never a statistically 
significant variable in the empirical analysis. Lacking information on what farmers knew 
about the National Food Authority program ahead of time, and what they could expect with 
its coverage, we could not build and adequate model of price anticipation. Hence, we were 
unable to estimate the parameter ap of the models above. 
 Table III reports descriptive statistics on the variables that were found significant in the 
analysis. The distribution of plot size indicates a high level of fragmentation. Plot size 
varies from 0.16 to 10 ha, with 93% of them below 4 ha, and 77% between 0.5 and 4 ha. 
Most households cultivate only one plot in rice, 16 households have 2 plots, and 4 have 3 
plots. Hence plot size itself captures most of the variability in land asset. There is a surprisingly 
large variability in fertilizer price and wage. Fertilizer prices exhibit a systematic difference
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across villages, increasing as one move further away form commercial centers, from Village 
Tu in Central Luzon where fertilizer price is 191 pesos per sack, to Aq where it is 207 pesos, 
and Du where it reaches 234 pesos. By contrast, there is less village difference in wages 
which average 50 pesos per day in Du, 54 pesos in Aq, and 57 in the better-off village Tu. In 
both cases, the great variability within village, however, will allow us to capture the response 
to fertilizer price and wage, independently of a potential village effect. 
  Simple examination of the reported averages unveils few differences between tenancies. 
One is that the non-kin sharecropper households seem somewhat less well-off than the other 
categories. On average, they have less land assets, they own less machinery, a smaller 
percentage of them has off-farm income, and their off-farm income is substantially lower. 
Their average education is also lower than in the other groups. What could appear to be a 
tenancy characteristic is, however, a village characteristic. Recall that the incidence of non-
kin tenancy is higher in village Aq of Panay Island, the poorest of the three villages. However, 
within the two villages Aq and Du, there is no systematic difference in assets among the two 
types of sharecroppers, except in education, where non-kin sharecroppers have 3.5 and 4.5 
years of schooling compared to 5.3 and 7.8 for the kin sharecroppers. This location bias also 
explains why the percentage of irrigated plots amongst the non-kin sharecroppers is much 
lower than in the other tenancies. That kin sharecroppers have on average a larger rice plot, 
and consequently a lower family share in labor, is not a systematic characteristic across 
villages either. This solely comes from the land distribution within village Tu, which moreover 
has larger plots than the other two villages. 
  In contrast to these asset distribution disparities, a genuine difference between tenancies 
appears in the wage that they pay to hired workers. Systematically in all three villages, 
sharecroppers hire workers at lower wages than do fixed-rent tenants and owners. Daily 
wages paid by sharecroppers are 40 pesos versus 6 in village Aq, 42 pesos versus 52 in 
village Du, and 49 pesos versus 60 in village Tu. There are no noticeable differences, however, 
among the two categories of sharecroppers., This is quite essential for our analysis in which 
we contrast the two categories of sharecroppers in terms of their labor use. 
 Average levels of input by tenancy suggest that kin sharecroppers are not very different 
from owners and fixed-rent tenants in terms of labor, fertilizer, and machine or animal power 
use per hectare, while non-kin sharecroppers use less inputs. We need, however, to test 
whether these average observations correspond to differential behavior, as hypothesized in 
the model above, and not simply to differential asset characteristics. This is done by estimating 
input demand functions for labor time and fertilizer, as reported in Table IV. 
 In the case of labor, the effective input is labor effort, which combines labor time and
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effort intensity. As effort intensity isnot easily observable, it is usually assumed that workers 
who have a contract over labor time would adjust heir effort intensity in accordance to 
incentives. However, when the contract does not regulate time, there is no reason to expect 
a downward adjustment ofeffort intensity differentially from a downward adjustment of
labor time'. hence, observed labor time is, in that case, a good indicator of labor effort. 
Another point of debate is whether labor time itself is observable ornot. The incentive for a 
sharecropper not to reveal the true time worked only arises vis-a-vis his landlord and when 
the contract specifies labor time. This is the essence of the enforcement problem in 
sharecropping. Hence, there is no reason to suspect that enumerators cannot obtain reliable 
information on labor input, even from sharecroppers in kinship contracts where labor is 
regulated. To avoid these problems of observability, indirect inference on input use is 
sometimes done from estimation of yield or residual profits equations, rather than input 
demand. The problem with this approach is that the impact of input use is mediated by 
random shocks. This can substantially reduce the quality of the econometric results when 
samples are small ike in our case. 
  As discussed above, we consider two alternative formulations of labor input demand. In 
model 1, the endogenous variable is total abor and family share is considered exogenous; in 
model 2, the endogenous variable is hired labor and family labor is considered a quasi-fixed 
input. 
  As machinery and animals are both owned and rented, their marginal costs vary greatly 
across households and are difficult to evaluate. Hence, the variable machinery and animal 
power use, which is an aggregation f rented services and imputed value for use of owned 
equipment, is always considered aquasi-fix input. The choice of performing weeding 
manually is considered a technological choice predetermined to the amount of factor use. 
To take into account apossible simultaneity problem, Hausman specification tests were 
performed. The null hypothesis ofabsence of correlation between these two variables and 
the residual could not be rejected, and hence simple OLS estimates are reported. 
 The results for the different factor demand equations are remarkably consistent (Table 
IV). Input demand is influenced by the share of output received by the tenant when the 
contract is with a non-kin landlord (a'P > 0), and it is not influenced by the retained share 
when the contract iswith a kin landlord (a"P = 0). The parameter a'p, expected tobe equal to 
the price elasticity aP which could not be estimated, is at least in the order of magnitude ofan 
elasticity. These empirical results uggest that, indeed, sharecroppers in kin contracts behave 
cooperatively, while sharecroppers in non-kin contracts have the standard Marshallian 
inefficient behavior.
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 We find that greater availability of family labor leads to lower fertilizer and hired labor 
use, as expected. The impact of family share on fertilizer use is of the expected negative 
sign, but the implied value for a is not of a meaningful order of magnitude. We experimented 
with two variables to capture the importance ofthe gama contracts, a dummy variable and a 
share of total pre-harvest work performed by gama workers. Neither one of them came out 
significantly. This is somewhat odds with our expectation that gama workers would have 
low efficiency in response to low incentives in weeding. Our experience isthat farmers 
often hire casual workers to complement the weeding operation when gama workers do not 
perform well. 
  Among the technological nd productive asset variables, manual weeding and use of 
machine or animal power are found to lead to higher fertilizer and labor use; availability of 
women in the family lowers fertilizer use; irrigation increases fertilizer uses. We also find 
that he classical inverse relationship between labor intensity and area holds. 
  The availability of off-farm income and presence ofa debt (access tocredit), which reflect 
the availability of liquidity in the household essential for off-season expenditures and for 
income smoothing across years, capture lements of credit constraint and risk aversion. As 
expected, these sources of liquidity facilitate the use of purchased inputs: fertilizer and hired 
workers. With both a dummy and a level variable the influenced of these xternal sources of 
income, when they are positive, is equal to: 
  ay - a'y lny. 
  This indicates that his income has a positive but decreasing influence on input use (the 
value eaylay beyond which the total effect would be negative isseveral orders of magnitude 
above the observed values). For the observed average values, off-farm income and access to 
credit lead to increases of 25% and 40% in fertilizer use, respectively, and off-farm income 
to an increase of 5% in hired labor. 
 The riskiness of the household income is the ratio of the expected value of the risky 
income (expected value of agricultural production) in total income. This ratio is first estimated 
using all the agricultural nd non-agricultural assets, and the prices that we observed. Of 
these variables only total and assets, value of owned machinery, and a dummy variable for 
village Tu, contribute to predicting the household portfolio choice (with an adjusted R2 of 
0.14). This predicted riskiness of the household income is then used as an explanatory variable 
of input use on each plot. Our results uggest that riskiness reduces fertilizer use but not 
labor use. 
 The village dummy variables capture anumber of factors affecting input use, including 
different transactions costs and the weather element of production risk.
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6. Conclusion 
  The principal controversy in the debate on efficiency of sharecropping has been about the 
problem of enforceability of the contract. Enforceability of a single short-term contract is 
admittedly almost impossible at low cost in the spatially dispersed and uncertain environment 
that is characteristic of agriculture. Theory suggests, however, that cooperation can be 
sustained when close links exist among the partners that induce some "moral" behavior 
encompassing altruism and preventing cheating, or when the contract is embedded in a long-
term relationship and interlined with reciprocal credit and insurance agreements. Family 
networks typically provide this environment conductive to cooperation. We therefore 
hypothesized that sharecroppers who have a kinship relationship with their landlord behave 
efficiently in applying the socially optimum level of inputs and effort on their land, despite 
the disincentive effect that the sharing of output gives them. 
 Analysis of a household survey from the Philippines confirms this hypothesis. We find 
that the behavior of sharecroppers with a kinship relationship with their landlord is not affected 
by the terms of the contract, while the behavior of the other sharecroppers responds to the 
contract terms. We characterized the meaning of this family tie through a survey of opinion 
conducted among tenants. It shows that kin landlords indeed help or are expected to help 
more frequently in case of emergency than the other landlords, and they do some with a 
wider range of instruments, providing the incentive for operative behavior in sharecropping 
contracts among kin.
Note
' Using a Taylor expansion In The quadratic and higher order terms
 are negligible since both a and share shares. 
z Production is function of labor effort L = Te
, where T is labor time and e effort intensity. The 
 disincentive effect to workers comes from the fact that wage payments are function of T while 
 disutility of labor is function of labor effort Te. For sharecroppers working their land, both payment, 
 which is a share of output, and disutility of labor are function of Te.
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Tenancy distribution (percentage) 
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The Meaning of Kinship
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Number of observations 
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   - with limited liability on rent (%) 
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Tenant cooperates (%) 
- by working hard (%) 
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Only source of insurance (%) 









Note: for 6 fixed rent contracts, the family relationship is not known. 
n.a. = not applicable. 




Descriptive Statistics by Tenancy
Sharecropper with 
  kin landlord 
(average) (st. dev.)
   Other 
  sharecropper 
(average) (st. dev.)
  Fixed rent 
    tenant 
(average) (st. dev.)
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(average) (st. dev.) (average)(st. dev.)
All 
(minimum)(maximum)
Number of observations 
Prices 
 Fertilizer (pesos per sack) 
 Wage (pesos per day) 
Household characteristics 
 Land asset (ha) 
 Owned machinery (% of hh) 
 Off-farm income 
     - (% with off-farm inc.) 
     - (average, in 1000 pesos) 
 Debt - (% with debt) 
     - (average, in 1000 pesos) 
 Education of head (years) 
 Women in family labor force (%) 
Rice plots 
 Area (ha) 
 Irrigated plots (% of plots) 
 Manual weeding (%of plots) 
 Share of family in total labor (%) 
 Labor use (man-day per ha) 
 Fertilizer use (sack per ha) 
 Machine/animal power 
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Table IV
Input Demand with Different Contracts , under Different Specifications of the Labor Model
Endogenous variables 









Exogenous variables parameter . t-stat parameter t-stat parameter t-stat parameter t-stat
Prices and shares 
 In (price) 
   In (output share), no kin 
   In (output share), kin 
 In (p fertilizer) 






































 Family share in labor -aaw 
 In (family labor/ha) aF 
Technology and productive assets az 
 In (plot area) 
 Manual weeding° 
 Rainfed 
 In (traction power/ha)' 
 Share women in labor force
Credit constraint and risk 
 Dummy off farm income 
 In (off farm income) 
   Dummy debt 
 I (debt) 
Household income portfolio 













































































-5 .5 - .31
.51
-3 .3
* Family and hired labor are perfect substitutes in model 1, and imperfect substitutes in model 2. In model 2, 
 only hired labor is introduced as family labor is considered a quasi-fixed factor. 
° Hausman specification tests were performed on these variables and coefficients of predicted values found not 
 significantly diffemt from 0. 
n.a. Variable not in the model. 
Blank means that the plot, household, or village characteristic was eliminated from the regression, after its 
coefficient was found not significantly different from 0.
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